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Lesson 31: How Do the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Protect against Unreasonable Law Enforcement Procedures?
Lesson Purpose
When you have finished this lesson, you should be able to explain the purpose and history of the Fourth Amendment and issues raised by its interpretation. You also should be able to explain the importance of the Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination. Finally, you should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on contemporary issues involving the Fourth Amendment and self-incrimination.
Lesson Objectives
- explain the purpose and history of the Fourth Amendment and issues raised by its interpretation,
- explain the importance of the Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination,
- evaluate, take, and defend positions on contemporary issues involving the Fourth Amendment and self-incrimination.
Lesson Terms
Lesson Court Cases
Case Summary
While working as a customs collector for the federal government, Samuel Swartwout embezzled more than $1 billion. He used this money to purchase land in New Jersey. In accordance with an act passed in 1820, the Treasury Department issued a warrant of distress against Swartwout. This voided his purchase of land and provided for the seizure of the money he embezzled. Swartwout argued that the 1820 Act violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law since it authorized a non-judicial procedure to remove property. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to resolve conflicting opinions of judges on the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.
Question(s)
Does the federal government violate the due process of law guarantee of the Fifth Amendment by recovering funds embezzled from it through nonjudicial procedures?
Answer(s)
No. Justice Benjamin R. Curtis delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court found that "due process of law" meant that all citizens be tried "by the law of the land," a concept established by the Magna Carta. When issuing the warrant, the Treasury Department properly applied the 1820 Act, which was part of the "law of the land." Since the "constitution contains no description of those processes which it [the due process clause] was intended to allow or forbid," the Court examined traditions of common law to find whether nonjudicial warrants had a precedential basis. It found that they did, and did not find a constitutional provision prohibiting their use. Therefore, the Court concluded the act conformed with the federal government's "power to collect and disburse revenue," which "includes all known and appropriate means of effectually collecting and disbursing that revenue." If a recipient disputes the sum he owes, he may rely upon his procedural right to petition a district court to consider "whether he is indebted as recited in the warrant."
See: The Oyez Project, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856)
Case Summary
Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.
Question(s)
Did the search and seizure of Weeks's home violate the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks's residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule."
See: The Oyez Project, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Case Summary
Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.
Question(s)
Did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights?
Answer(s)
No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home--not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).
See: The Oyez Project, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
Case Summary
Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.
Question(s)
Does Palko's second conviction violate the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because this protection applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause?
Answer(s)
No. The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.
Case Summary
Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. An indigent, he was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty while maintaining he had a right to counsel and arguing his own defense.
Question(s)
Does denying a request for counsel for an indigent defendant violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces the defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. The Court ruled that the previously discovered right to counsel provided by the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel states to provide counsel to any defendant. Justice Owen Roberts' opinion asserted that the right to counsel merely prevented the state from interfering in a defendant's request for representation rather than requiring a state to offer counsel. This decision was overturned in Gideon v. Wainwright.
Case Summary
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld a number of convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.
Question(s)
Were the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Answer(s)
Sometimes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.
Case Summary
Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.
Question(s)
Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?
Answer(s)
Not applicable. No. The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic--and controversial--decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.
Case Summary
William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after ninety days and Malloy was placed on two years' probation. Some sixteen months following his plea, a superior court-appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, "on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. Both the superior court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruled against him, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question(s)
Does the Fourteenth Amendment protect a state witness's Fifth Amendment guarantee again self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. When determining if state officers properly obtained a confession, one must focus on whether the statements were made freely and voluntarily without any direct or implied promised or improper influence. Noting that the American judicial system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment secures defendants against self-incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses' statements.
Case Summary
The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an incriminating statement, all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.
Question(s)
Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.
Case Summary
Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth he used without first obtaining a search warrant. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The court of appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself.
Question(s)
Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?
Answer(s)
Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.
See: The Oyez Project, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Case Summary
Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.
Question(s)
Did the search and seizure of Terry and the other men violate of the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.
Case Summary
Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.
Question(s)
Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?"
Answer(s)
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.
See: The Oyez Project, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
Case Summary
Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris's initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to attack his credibility.
Question(s)
Did the use of Harris' post-arrest statement violate his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision?
Answer(s)
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Miranda decision did not mandate that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case must be barred for all purposes from the trial. The Court reasoned that the shield provided by Miranda could not be "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." The Court found that the speculative possibility that police misconduct could be encouraged was outweighed by the value of admitting the statement into the impeachment process.
Case Summary
A police officer pulled over and arresting Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.
Question(s)
Did the officer's search violate the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.
See: The Oyez Project, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
Case Summary
This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an unlawful "seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any "objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place.
Question(s)
Do police officers violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures when, during a routine traffic stop, they obtain evidence through a search conducted after asking the suspect to exit the vehicle without a justifiable reason to do so?
Answer(s)
No. The Court held, in a 6-3 unsigned decision issued on behalf of the entire court, that the search did not violate Mimms's rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that the officers had already detained Mimms in order to issue him a traffic summons and felt that asking him to exit the vehicle was a minimal and reasonable intrusion of his freedom. Whether the search occurred inside or outside the car was irrelevant to the Court: the officers had stopped Mimms for a legitimate reason and, upon observing the bulge in his jacket, any person of reasonable caution would have conducted the search. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that such searches, in order to conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, must relate to the reason for the stop. Because the officers had detained Mimms for an expired license plate, searching him for concealed weapons was not within the scope of the stop and therefore made it an unlawful search. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, filed a separate dissent arguing that the majority opinion gave too much discretion to police officers, allowing them to search detainees whenever they could invent any basis for concern.
See: The Oyez Project, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
Case Summary
Minnesota police believed co-defendant Armstrong was buying chloroform to use in making illicit drugs, so they arranged with a seller to place a radio transmitter into a container Armstrong purchased. Officers used the transmitter signals to follow the car into which the chloroform container was placed, which led them to Knotts's remote cabin in Wisconsin. After three days of visual surveillance, officers obtained a search warrant and entered the cabin, where they found the chloroform with materials and equipment for making amphetamines. Knotts attempted to have the transmitter evidence suppressed on the grounds that the warrantless monitoring constituted an illegal search, but was denied and convicted. An appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the transmitter violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Question(s)
Did planting a radio transmitter and monitoring its signal without a warrant constitute an illegal search or seizure?
Answer(s)
No. The defendant had no reasonable expectation to privacy that was breached by the radio transmitter. Police essentially followed the involved car on public streets, where there is no legitimate expectation of privacy. Nothing suggested police used the transmitter to follow the movements inside the cabin, where there is an expectation of privacy, and nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the use of technology to aid in sensory surveillance.
Case Summary
Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.
Question(s)
Did the closure of the hearing violate the right to a public trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Answer(s)
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to suppression hearings. The Court found that the "aims and interests" of public trials were "no less pressing in a hearing to suppress wrongfully seized evidence." The Court noted that the presumption of openness for trials could be overcome only by overriding interests based on findings that closure was absolutely necessary to preserve higher values and was narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
See: The Oyez Project, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)
Case Summary
Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the state.
Question(s)
Did the search of Palmer's locker and cell violate the Fourth Amendment? Did prison officials deprive Hudson of his property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply "within the confines of the prison cell." Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that "the paramount interest in institutional security" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that "random and unauthorized" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as post-deprivation remedies were available.
See: The Oyez Project, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
Case Summary
Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl whose body laid along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.
Question(s)
Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained?
Answer(s)
No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence. It was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body, even absent Williams's statements.
Case Summary
Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.
Question(s)
Was Elstad's written confession made invalid by the failure of the officers to administer Miranda warnings at his home?
Answer(s)
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that "...the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when "custody" legally begins. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that the holding "in no way retreat[ed] from the bright-line rule of Miranda."
Case Summary
T.L.O. was fourteen years old; she was accused of smoking in the girls' bathroom of her high school. A principal at the school questioned her and searched her purse, yielding a bag of marijuana and other drug paraphernalia.
Question(s)
Did the search violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Answer(s)
No. Citing the peculiarities associated with searches on school grounds, the Court abandoned its requirement that searches be conducted only when a "probable cause" exists that an individual has violated the law. The Court used a less strict standard of "reasonableness" to conclude that the search did not violate the Constitution. The presence of rolling papers in the purse gave rise to a reasonable suspicion in the principal's mind that T.L.O. may have been carrying drugs, thus, justifying a more thorough search of the purse.
See: The Oyez Project, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
Case Summary
A California policeman determined that there was probable cause to search Horton's home for the proceeds of a robbery and the robbers' weapons. His search warrant affidavit referred to police reports that described both the weapons and the proceeds, but the warrant that was issued only authorized a search for the proceeds. Upon executing the warrant, the officer did not find the stolen property but did find the weapons in plain view and seized them. The trial court refused to suppress the seized evidence, and Horton was convicted of armed robbery. The California court of appeal affirmed the decision. Since the officer had testified that while he was searching Horton's home for the stolen property he was also interested in finding other evidence connecting Horton to the robbery, the seized evidence was not discovered "inadvertently." However, in rejecting Horton's argument that Coolidge v. New Hampshire required suppression of that evidence, the court of appeal relied on a state supreme court decision stating that Coolidge's discussion of the inadvertence limitation on the "plain-view" doctrine was not binding because it was contained in a four-Justice plurality opinion.
Question(s)
Were the weapons seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. The court found that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of belongings not specifically listed in a warrant found in plain sight during a legal search for other items, even though the discovery was not inadvertent, as Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) mandated.
Case Summary
Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Sarivola's wife, Donna. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second was based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona supreme court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.
Question(s)
Did the Arizona supreme court properly apply the totality of circumstances test when considering whether a suspect's confession to murder was coerced? Did the Arizona supreme court properly apply harmless error analysis when considering whether the suspect's coerced confession influenced the outcome of the trial?
Answer(s)
Yes. Yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.
Case Summary
California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The appellate court reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle (U.S. v. Ross), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container (U.S. v. Chadwick). The appellate court decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence--not the car generally--they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California supreme court denied review, but the Supreme Court agreed to hear the State's case.
Question(s)
Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the court of appeals and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.
See: The Oyez Project, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
Case Summary
The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.
Question(s)
Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?
Answer(s)
Sometimes. In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.
See: The Oyez Project, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
Case Summary
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The district court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the court of appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."
Question(s)
May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during an involuntary interrogation?
Answer(s)
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."
See: The Oyez Project, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
Case Summary
A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal imaging device to scan his home. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the court of appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."
Question(s)
Does the use of a thermal imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and were, thus, "information in the public domain."
See: The Oyez Project, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
Case Summary
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the court of appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.
Question(s)
Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.
See: The Oyez Project, Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
Case Summary
Samuel Patane was arrested at his home for calling his ex-girlfriend in violation of a restraining order. During the arrest, police offers began reading Patane his Miranda rights. Patane told the officers that he knew his rights. The officers then stopped reading them, at which point Patane told police that he had a gun in his house. They searched the house with his permission and found the gun. As an ex-felon, Patane was not permitted to possess a gun and was prosecuted for possession. During the trial on gun possession charges, Patane argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself because there was not probable cause to arrest him and because the gun had been found as a result of an un-Mirandized confession. The district court initially ruled that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that it was therefore unconstitutional. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed, holding that Patane's ex-girlfriend had given police probable cause for the arrest. However, the panel held that gun could not be used as evidence because it had been found as the result of an un-Mirandized (and therefore unconstitutional) confession. The government appealed, arguing that physical evidence found as the result of un-Mirandized testimony could be used in court, despite the fact that the testimony itself was inadmissable.
Question(s)
Can physical evidence found as a result of un-Mirandized but voluntary testimony be used in court?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a decision without a majority opinion, three justices wrote that the Miranda warnings were merely intended to prevent violations of the Constitution, and that because Patane's un-Mirandized testimony was not admitted at trial the Constitution (specifically the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination) had not been violated. Physical evidence obtained from un-Mirandized statements, as long as those statement were not forced by police, were constitutionally admissible. Two other justices also held that the physical evidence was constitutionally admissible, but did so with the understanding that the Miranda warnings must be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system. They did not discuss whether the Miranda warnings were, in themselves, constitutionally required.
Case Summary
Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that she might have ibuprofen on her person,violating school policy. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in an Arizona district court. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals upheld the dismissal. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances.
Question(s)
1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? 2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983?
Answer(s)
Sometimes, fact dependent. No. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing with Justice Stevens's point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were partially immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make in the interest of keeping their schools safe.
See: Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___ (2009)
Case Summary
Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep--without judicial approval--and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the ""Levels"" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.
Question(s)
Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights?
Answer(s)
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.
Case Summary
David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed.
Question(s)
Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches?
Answer(s)
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a ""Faraday bag."" The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using ""cloud computing"" is not even ""on the arrestee's person."" Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.
Case Summary
In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain ""transactional records"" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when ""specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."" The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers--""cell site"" location information (CSLI). Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question(s)
Does the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, which include the location and movements of cell phone users, violate the Fourth Amendment?
Answer(s)
The government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into existing precedents, but tracking person's movements and location through extensive cell-site records is far more intrusive than the precedents might have anticipated. The Court declined to extend the ""third-party doctrine""--a doctrine where information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy--to cell-site location information, which implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS tracking does. One consideration in the development of the third-party doctrine was the ""nature of the particular documents sought,"" and the level of intrusiveness of extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held narrowly that the government generally will need a warrant to access cell-site location information.
Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. Justice Kennedy would find that cell-site records are no different from the many other kinds of business records the government has a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process. Justice Kennedy would continue to limit the Fourth Amendment to its property-based origins.
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, emphasizing the property-based approach to Fourth Amendment questions. In Justice Thomas's view, the case should not turn on whether a search occurred, but whose property was searched. By focusing on this latter question, Justice Thomas reasoned, the only logical conclusion would be that the information did not belong to Carpenter.
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito distinguishes between an actual search and an order ""merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified documents""--with the former being far more intrusive than the latter. Justice Alito criticizes the majority for what he characterizes as ""allow[ing] a defendant to object to the search of a third party's property,"" a departure from long-standing Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which he emphasizes the ""original understanding"" of the Fourth Amendment and laments the Court's departure from it.
The preceding case summary was provided by Oyez and licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Please visit Oyez.org for more case summaries.
Lesson Primary Sources
Virginia Declaration of Rights
The Bill of Rights as it was submitted to the states for ratification. It included a preamble and ten proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The Habeas Corpus Act 1679 is an act of the English Parliament defining the habeas corpus process, by which a detainee who has petitioned the judiciary must either be set free or have a charge brought against him. The act follows the Habeas Corpus Act 1640, by which an order from the king or Privy Council was deemed insufficient as a response to a petition of habeas corpus.
Act passed by the British Parliament in 1689 enumerating rights of British subjects and residents. A restating of the Declaration of Right presented to William and Mary a year prior, it guarantees the right to petition the monarch, bear arms for defense, and outlines some requirements for the monarch to seek consent of the people through Parliament.
The oldest continuously functioning constitution in the world, the Massachusetts Constitution provided the framework followed by the United States Constitution. It went into effect on October 25, 1780.
From Wikipedia: Magna Carta, is an English legal charter, originally issued in 1215, the first document ever served to an English king by his subjects. Magna Carta required King John to proclaim certain rights, respect certain legal procedures, and accept that his will could be restricted by the law. It explicitly protected certain rights of the King's subjects and supported what became the writ of habeas corpus, allowing appeal against unlawful imprisonment. Magna Carta was arguably the most significant early influence on the extensive historical process that led to the rule of constitutional law today in the much of the world.
From Wikipedia: The Massachusetts Body of Liberties was the first legal code to be instituted by European colonists in New England. The laws were established by the Massachusetts General Court in 1641 and include both positive and negative rights.
From Wikipedia: The Petition of Right is a major English constitutional document, which sets out specific liberties of the subject that the king is prohibited from infringing. The Petition is most notable for its confirmation of the principles that taxes can be levied only by Parliament, that martial law may not be imposed in time of peace, and that prisoners must be able to challenge the legitimacy of their detentions through the writ of habeas corpus. Additionally, the Petition's ban on the billeting of troops is reflected in the Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
From Wikipedia: In the United States, the Bill of Rights is the name by which the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution are known. They were introduced by James Madison to the First United States Congress in 1789 as a series of articles, and came into effect on December 15, 1791, when they had been ratified by three quarters of the states. It responded largely to Anti-Federalists who believed that ratifying the U.S. Constitution meant surrendering basic human rights of individuals.
The supreme law of the United States that provides the framework for the government. The Constitution outlines the nation's institutions of government and the most important rights of the people. The document was created in 1787 during the Philadelphia Convention. The government created by the Constitution took effect on March 4, 1789.
From Wikipedia: A Miranda warning is a warning given by police in the U.S. to criminal suspects in police custody, or in a custodial situation, before they are interrogated. A custodial situation is one in which the suspect's freedom of movement is restrained (judged by the "free to leave" test), even if he is not under arrest. An elicited incriminating statement by a suspect will not constitute admissable evidence unless the suspect was informed of his/her "Miranda rights" and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. The Miranda warnings were mandated by the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Miranda v. Arizona as a means of protecting a criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment right to avoid coercive self-incrimination. The reading of the Miranda warning might be omitted during arrest, such as if the evidence is already sufficient to indict, or if the suspect is talkative and volunteers information (without being asked). The admissibility of conversations, as evidence, is judged on a case-by-case basis, subject to appeal.
